

Questions and thoughts. First some questions for DE? What role does Dan see the Athens and Ann Arbor speeches playing in the book? I assume that it has become central because it connects the question of war-planning, related speeches in which he was involved to varying extents to some degree and Berlin and Cuba, in which he was also involved.

Other questions, concerns: getting to the heart of what's going on; desire to know, versus how does one present the essentials in a book? I.e, maybe I ought to drop the whole thing. But I'm interested in what it was all about, including the speeches? And related policymaking.

Complicated LeCarre plot because of secrecy/alliances. Europeans, especially the West Germans the French, want a seemingly irrevocable nuclear commitment to Berlin. However, there are a complex web of motives here. Ultimately the US-Allied position in Berlin is unsustainable if the Soviets are really willing to go to the mat for it; and yet, if it appears that the US is willing to go to the mat as well, including up to the first-use of nuclear weapons and/or a possible preemptive escalatory first strike, then the Soviets might be deterred.

There is another aspect here too. By giving the US responsibility for the security guarantee, if the US decides to cave in, then the French and the Germans can blame it on the US. DeGaulle appears to believe that if the French stay strong, at least rhetorically, then any backing down over Berlin and Germany will be blamed on the US, facilitating a Franco-German rapprochement. What is important for the French, here, is that by standing strong and letting the Americans take the fall, they can guard against German neutralism and greater ties with the Russians, while simultaneously preserving the centrality of France in Western Europe and world politics, based on greater Germany independence from the US and an alliance with France. Question: what role, if any, could France's nuclear deterrent play here? Trading Paris for Berlin? What was the French attitude towards Germany's acquiring nuclear weapons?

On the German nuclear question: The desire of some German elites for an independent German nuclear weapons program may have been real. At the same time, another possibly motivating factor was that by brandishing the idea of an independent German deterrent Germany might be able to increase their pressure on Americans to make a strong nuclear commitment to Berlin, while rebuffing negotiations; i.e., give us a security guarantee and don't bargain away our security, lest we move towards increasing independence and an alliance with France. Another way of formulating this is: we're willing to provide for our own security; so don't bargain this away along with whatever rights we have to Berlin. So, to repeat, the Germans also press for strong nuclear commitment for Berlin and Germany but refuse to be flexible on negotiations, and keep coming back to the possibility of an independent nuclear force of their own.

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about?

Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace* (Princeton University Press, 1999: 320-321):

"...The twenty missiles that the Soviets had in Cuba, as Kennedy noted after the missile crisis, "had had a deterrent effect on us," and this, he pointed out, meant that small nuclear forces were not without deterrent value.

By the same token, countries like France and Germany—in particular if they cooperated with each other, and especially if they received help from the United States—would be able to build nuclear forces that could in theory counterbalance the Soviet threat...All the European countries had to do was to build a survivable force of a certain absolute size, and to Kennedy it was clearly not beyond their capability to do so. "If the French and other European powers acquire a nuclear capability," he said in January 1962, "they would be in a position to be entirely independent and we might be on the outside looking in." *Real?*

So if U.S. leaders claimed that European nuclear forces had no deterrent value, this was not because such claims reflected their real thinking. If they argued for a strategy of controlled nuclear war they did not really believe in, this must have been because that strategy served an important political purpose. The Europeans were to be convinced or pressured or cajoled into getting out of the "nuclear business" and accepting a system in which power was concentrated in American hands: this, by 1962 at any rate, was the real purpose of the new American strategic doctrine." [Athens and Ann Arbor] [and then in a footnote that comes here on pp. 320-321] "Denigrating European nuclear forces was a tactic that the U.S. government deliberately adopted for political reasons. McNamara, for example, noted at one point that "disparaging French nuclear capabilities" was something that could be done for political purposes.... The assumption that even small nuclear capabilities would have major (but, from the U.S. point of view, undesireable) political effects; it was therefore important to dissuade other countries from going nuclear; and to do that one had to deny that relatively small nuclear forces were of much value. The Gilpatric Committee report on the nuclear proliferation problem, although prepared a bit later, provides a good illustration of this kind of thinking. The report recognized that new nuclear capabilities would affect the distribution of power in the world, and noted that as more countries went nuclear, American "diplomatic and military influence would wane." It then argued that in order to "minimize the incentives for others to acquire nuclear weapons," the Americans had to "avoid giving an exaggerated impression of their importance and utility," and that the United States needed to "stress the current and future important role of conventional armaments"—which, is yet another example of how the flexible response doctrine is to be understood, to a certain extent, in instrumental terms."

McN argues:
no chance/hope
of getting French
to forego nuc
force.

[338] "...the American view in late 1961 and through most of 1962 was that France and Germany could not be allowed to get away with their phony displays of "toughness." They would have to face up to their responsibilities. The U.S. government, Rusk said in December 1961, "was determined not to be cast in the role of the 'fall guy' for the French and the Germans—on other words to be the ones who made concessions which were afterwards described as betrayals." France and Germany had to be made to sign on to the common policy...Kennedy...[I]n April 1962...surprised Macmillan "by the bitterness of his feeling" toward the French. Relations now were about as bad as they ever get between allied powers."

[339] "If the United States mishandled the situation, the Germans might "pick up their French option," as Henry Kissinger, then a White House consultant, put it in February 1962."

"So by early 1962, Adenauer was starting to take what the U.S. government saw as a more defiant line. He knew that his position had become stronger now that he had a "French card" to play."